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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Taxation-A System of Federal Credits for Taxes Paid to
States-The Clarkson Tobacco Tax Resolution.
The 1931 General Assembly of North Carolina passed a resolu-
tion that Congress be requested to enact a law providing "that when-
ever any State of the Union levies a tax for revenue on any com-
modity or article upon which the United States government levies a
like or similar tax the United States government will remit to the
person, firm or corporation paying said tax an amount equal to the
tax levied by the State for said purpose upon said commodity or
article, provided the State tax does not exceed 20 per cent of the tax
[189]
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levied by the United States government."1  Should Congress enact
this proposal, the states in which the federal government collects
commodity taxes would impose taxes on the commodities to the
amount of 20 per cent of the federal tax. The state levies would not
increase the federal taxpayer's burden since his federal taxes would
be decreased by the amount paid to the state. The preamble to the
resolution, which was introduced by State Senator Francis 0. Clark-
son of Mecklenburg County, recites that for 1930 the federal govern-
ment collected from tobacco and cigarette taxes imposed in North
Carolina, $256,729,938.33, and in the last eleven years over two bil-
lion dollars; that in 1929 North Carolina collected for all state pur-
poses, from income, inheritance, license and franchise taxes, $15,-
823,932.63; that the tobacco farmers are estimated to have received
in 1930 an average of about 12 cents a pound for tobacco, whereas
the federal government placed a tax of about 96 cents a pound on
tobacco and cigarettes. In 1930 the federal government received
from tobacco taxes over 450 million dollars 2 while the farm value
of that year's crop was less than 217 million dollars.3 And in the
same year that the tobacco manufacturers in North Carolina paid
256 million dollars in tobacco taxes the North Carolina farmer re-
ceived only 70 million dollars for the crop.4 The contrast is even
more striking at present when the farmers are getting still less for
the 1931 crop.
The tobacco industry has long contributed a substantial amount
of revenue to the federal government. As early as 1794 Congress
levied a tax on snuff, but the early tobacco taxes were short-lived.5
From 1862 the system has been utilized constantly, and the tobacco
'N. C. PuB. LAWS (1931), Resolution No. 11. The resolution requested
Governor 0. Max Gardner to appoint a committee to memorialize Congress
as to this tax. Members of the committee are, F. 0. Clarkson, Chairman,
Robert Lassiter, Charles Whedbee, John W. Hinsdale, John C. McBee, Ken-
meth Royall, N. J. Rouse, Leland Kitchin.
Note 7 infra.
YEARBOOK OF AGRICULTURE (1931) 700.
"Note 12 infra.
'In 1794 Congress levied a tax of 8 cents per pound upon snuff manufac-
tured in the United States. 1 Stat. 384 (1794). The following year the tax
was taken off snuff and laid on snuff mills, 1 Stat. 426 (1795), and this tax was
repealed in 1800. 2 Stat. 54 (1800). In 1802 the entire system of internal
duties was repealed. 2 Stat. 148 (1802). A 20 per centum advalorem tax on
"tobacco, manufactured segars and snuff" was levied in 1815, 3 Stat. 180(1815), and repealed in 1816. 3 Stat. 254 (1816). The internal revenue sys-
tem was revived in 1862. 12 Stat. 463 (1862).
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taxes have grown from $3,090,000 in 18636 to $450,339,000 in 1930,7
constituting in 1930 about 11 per cent of the total revenue of the
federal government.8
However, all contributors to the production of this profitable tax
source do not fare as well as does the federal government. A study
made by the North Carolina Tax Commission shows the average net
income in 1927 of representative farms in the tobacco growing sec-
tions of North Carolina. In the Piedmont area the average net in-
come, including cash and products of the farm utilized (food, wood
and use of house) was $1,215, and in the Tidewater section the
average net income was $1,241.9 The study shows that in 1927 the
return on investment in farms in the Piedmont section was 2.6 per
cent, and in the Tidewater section 4.7 per cent.10 The report was of
the opinion that tobacco and cotton conditions were somewhat better
than normal in 1927. During the same year the percentage return
on invested capital of the four largest tobacco manufacturing com-
panies was from 4 per cent to 20 per cent." Since that time the
tobacco farmers' condition has not improved, 12 while the manufac-
6 SMITH, THE U. S. FEDERAL INTERNAL TAX HISTORY 1861-71 (1914) 333.
7 REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY FOR FISCAL YEAR 1930, 512.
Cigars, $21,441,500; cigarettes, $341,881,000; snuff, $7,542,000; chewing and
smoking tobacco, $60,098,000; cigarette papers and tubes, $1,323,800; miscel-
laneous collections relating to tobacco, $50,981.
8 The total ordinary receipts of the federal government in the fiscal year
1930 were $4,177,941,702. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, supra
note 7, at p. 2.
'REPORT OF THE N. C. TAX COMMISSION (1928) 121, 125.
Supra note 9, at 113, 115.
62 STANDARD TRADE AND SECUITIES, STATISTICAL SECTION, No. 18, §2, p.
92 (1931).
1 In 1928 the North Carolina tobacco crop of 493,180,438 pounds sold for
$100,043,086, or an average of 20 cents per pound; the 1929 crop of 493,226,562
pounds sold for $90,037,272 or an average of 18 cents per pound; the 1930 crop
of 565,556,018 pounds sold for $70,091,439, an average of 12 cents per pound.
NORTH CAROLINA FARM FORECASTER, May 1931, at p. 12.
"The tobacco farmers today are poor, disgruntled and resentful. Their
incomes are among the lowest farm incomes in the country and they are usually
in debt to the supply merchant.
"On the other hand the tobacco manufacturers are among the most pros-
perous concerns in the country. Their officials are high-salaried, and their
stockholders not only receive fat dividends but they also participate in the in-
creased equities resulting from the plowing of profits back into the industry,"
WooFTEt, THE PLIGHT OF CIGARETTE TOBACCO (1931) 5.
Profits derived from a 150 pound pile of tobacco have been thus analyzed:
At 8 cents a pound it brought $12.00. The auction fee was 15 cents, warehouse
charges 10 cents and a 2 1-3 per cent commission on the $12.00 was 30 cents,
making a total sales charge of 55 cents deducted from the $12.00. This left
$11.45 as pay for growing the 150 pounds of tobacco. This amount of tobacco
will make 50,000 cigarettes-2,500 packages of 20 cigarettes each for the retail
trade to sell at 15 cent' a package, or $375.00 for the finished product. This
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turers have continued to prosper. 13 A recent study 14 points out that
the tobacco companies do not compete seriously in the purchase of
tobacco, and in such a situation the farmers are offered only such
prices as will cause them to continue to produce what the industry
needs. It is also pointed out that an increase in the price paid for
raw tobacco will cause an increased production and subsequent lower
prices. Thus it would seem that a reduction in the federal tobacco
taxes would not be passed on to the farmers in the way of higher
prices, and, if it were, the increase in production would nullify the
temporary increase in price. The request of the General Assembly is
founded on the belief that it is the duty of the federal government
to take steps which will indirectly better the conditions in the agri-
cultural branch of the tobacco industry. "Certainly it can be main-
tained that in any industry which contributes as much to the Gov-
ernment as does the tobacco industry, it is the moral obligation of
the Government to do all in its power to see that all contributors to
the industry receive a fair share."'1  The revenue diverted to the
states under the credit clause proposed by the Clarkson resolution
would enable them to provide for improved schools and relieve local
taxation which bears heavily on the farmer. 16 An increase in the
price paid for raw tobacco would stimulate production of the crop,
but a reduction of the land tax might be a means of positively de-
creasing tobacco acreage. When the farmer has to raise money for
taxes, he is forced to produce a money crop and the live-at-home
movement is militated against.
The plan is not designed for the benefit of a single state. Al-
though 57 per cent of the federal tobacco taxes were collected in
North Carolina in 1930, there were six other states which together
leaves $362.55 to divide between the manufacturer, the government, the jobber
and the retailer: the government exacts $3.00 per 1,000 which in this case
would be $150.00 leaving the manufacturers, jobbers and retail dealers $213.55
as their share.-Raleigh News and Observer, January 11, 1932, from The
Progressive Farmer.
' In 1930 the per cent earned on invested capital of the four largest man-
ufacturing companies was, American Tobacco, 16.5; Liggett and Myers, 16.3;
P. Lorillard Co., 5.3; R. J. Reynolds, 21.7. 62 STANDARD TRADE AND SECU.-
niIEs, STATISTICAL SE CToN, No. 18, §2, p. 92 (1931).14WooFer, THE PLIGHT OF CiGARETIE TOBACCO (1931) 11.
Supra note 14, p. 64.
16 See Heer, The Rural Tax% Problem (1929) 8 SOCIAL FORCES 109; HoaBs,
NORTEH CAROLINA, SOCIAL AND ]ECONOMIC (1930) Ch. XI; REPORT OF THE TAx
COMMISSION (1928) 55.
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contributed 34 per cent.17 Two of these,1 8 however, are not tobacco
growing states, and there are fourteen states' 9 in which tobacco is
grown but not manufactured to any large extent. The result would
be that the tobacco growing states in which there is no manufacturing
could not levy a tax similar to that levied by the federal government,
which is a tax on the manufactured product, and consequently farm-
ers in these states would not benefit from the credit provision. An-
other plan has been suggested by which the federal government would
"rebate to the tobacco growing States an amount equal to an excise
tax levied by the State on the sales of raw tobacco.120 This plan
would take care of the states growing the tobacco although no federal
tax on the manufactured product is collected within the state; and
relief for tobacco growing states appears to be the desired object.
A tax on the sale of raw tobacco, however, would be a tax on an
activity of the farmer. It would seem better to place the tax on the
purchase of the raw tobacco at the tobacco warehouses. The pur-
chasers would then sell their tax receipts to the manufacturers who
would receive credits for them on their federal tobacco taxes.
Besides the tobacco taxes there are fifteen other federal taxes2 '
which would probably come within the scope of the Clarkson resolu-
tion. The total of these taxes in 1930 was $111,000,000,22 and the
collections were diffused over a large number of states. Conse-
quently, under the present federal revenue system the resolution
would be of substantial benefit to only the tobacco manufacturing
states. The enactment of current proposals enlarging the federal
commodity tax system would enable the credit system to benefit a
larger group of states.23
'Supra note 7, North Carolina, $256,729,938, 57 per cent; Virginia, $77,-
598,461, 17.23 per cent; New Jersey, $20,592,005, 4.57 per cent; Kentucky, $16,-
092,218, 3.57 per cent; New York, $15,090,231, 3.35 per cent; California, $13,-
668,198, 3.04 per cent; Ohio, $11,412,226, 2.53 per cent.
"New Jersey, California. YEaRBOOK OF AGRIcuLTuRE (1930) 709.
"Tennessee, Georgia, South Carolina, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Connecti-
cut, Maryland, Indiana, Florida, Massachusetts, West Virginia, Missouri, Min-
nesota, Louisiana.
2o Supra note 14, p. 64.
nSupra note 7, p. 210: bonds of indebtedness, capital stock issues, capital
stock sales and transfers, sales of produce for future delivery, playing cards,
oleomargarine, adulterated and process or renovated butter, filled cheese, mixed
flour, dues and initiation fees, admission to theatres, pistols and revolvers, dis-
tilled spirits, fermented liquors, and narcotics.
"Supra note 7, p. 211.
'On December 9, 1931, the Secretary of the Treasury in his annual report
recommended to Congress the enactment of taxes on manufacturer's sales of
automobiles, trucks, and accessories; a stamp tax on conveyances of realty; a
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A proposal for a federal credit or rebate will meet with' the attack
that "the function of the federal government is not to play the fairy
godmother to needy state revenues." However, where state and local
governmental expenditures aggregate 60 per cent and federal ex-
penditures 40 per cent, 24 where the political system appears ineffec-
tive equitably to provide state and local revenues, and where co3r-
dination of federal, state and local tax systems will result in an
adequate revenue and its just distribution, then such cotrdination in-
volving a system of federal credits would not be a gift, but a de-
sirable fiscal reform. Recent years have seen determined efforts to
relieve property of its heavy tax load. But the property tax is the
only tax which is effective against interstate competition. In 1924
Florida amended the state constitution and forbade the imposition
of an inheritance tax.2 5 This tempting invitation to the wealthy of
other states was defeated by the enactment of the federal estate tax
credit clause of 1924 which gave a credit on the federal tax of all state
tax paid up to 25 per cent of the federal tax ;26 and in 1926 this credit
was increased to 80 per cent.2 7 The effect of the clause is to eliminate
sanctuaries of escape from inheritance taxes. In 1930 Florida re-
amended the constitution28 and the next session of the legislature
passed an inheritance tax law taking advantage of the federal credit.2 9
Less than half of the states have personal income taxes, and the
rates imposed by the states which do use the tax are very low and
relatively unproductiveO except in the more wealthy states. The
tax on manufacturer's sales of radio and phonograph equipment and acces-
sories; a stamp tax on checks and drafts; and a tax on telephone, telegraph,
cable and radio messages. U. S. DAILY, December 10, 1931, at 2295.
21 NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, COST OF GOVERNMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES 1928-1929 (1931) 12. Percentage distribution of governmental
expenditures in 1928, federal, 31.5 per cent; state, 14.5 per cent; local, 54.0
per cent.
'Art. IX, §11.
'43 Stat. 303 (1924).
744 Stat. 70 (1926) ; 26 U. S. C. A. §1093 (1928).
"' See COMPILED GE~r. LAws FLORIDA (1930 Supp.) 688, ... the legislature
may provide for a tax upon inheritances, or for the levying of estate taxes not
exceeding in the aggregate the amounts which may by any law of the United
States be allowed to be credited against ... similar taxes levied by the United
States on the same subject, but the power of the legislature to levy such in-
heritance taxes or estate taxes . . . shall exist only so long as . . . a similar tax
is enforced by the United States against Florida inheritances or estates. ..
U. S. DAILY, May 12, 14, 21, 1931, at 614, 624, 684.
In the fiscal year ending June 30, 1930, the North Carolina personal in-
come tax yielded $1,780,307 out of a total of $15,293,565 collected under the
revenue act for the general fund for that year. REPORT OF THE N. C. TAX
CommIssIoN (1930) 441, 442.
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states are reluctant to adopt this tax or to increase the rates lest such
action drive the rich into other states. It has been suggested 1 that
the credit principle utilized in inheritance taxation be applied to the
personal income tax: that the federal government allow a credit on
the federal personal income tax of the amount paid in state personal
income tax up to a certain percentage of the federal tax. Again, the
effect of the credit clause would be to remove interstate competition.
It is common knowledge that corporations seek to arrange their
organizations so that their activities and income which are taxed will
be allocated to states where franchise and income taxes are light.
So long as one state is able to offer cut-rate corporate advantages it
will be difficult for other states satisfactorily to develop corporation
taxes. A subsidiary corporation may be organized in a state with
favorable tax laws, and the parent and subsidiary corporations may
tfansact business in such a manner that only the subsidiary in the
low tax state receives an appreciable income.32 Also, where fran-
chise taxes are measured by extent of business, the.corporation may
arrange to have those factors which determine extent of business
predominate in a low tax state. The principle of the federal credit
may be turned to account to nullify this circumvention. There will
not be the incentive to escape state taxation when that escape only
increases the corporation's federal taxes.
Legislatures in their perennial searches for more productive tax
sources, are giving increased consideration to sales taxes. One ob-
jection to the adoption by a state of this form of taxation is the dis-
advantage at which it will place local business in competition with
business in neighboring states.33 Local dealers who pass the tax on
"Mark Graves, Director of the Budget, New York State, Available Sources
of Revenue for Equalization of Taxes, U. S. DAILY, October 6, 1931, at 1782;
A Federal Income Tax Credit, Nzw REPUBLIc, November 11, 1930, at 339.
"No quarrel could be found with any state which, through the operation of
economies in its state and local governments, was able to boast of a lower
general level of taxes than its sister states. Such fiscal competition would be
healthy and a beneficial influence for the country as a whole. But no con-
demnation can be too severe for the fiscal hijacking whereby one state seeks
to steal a particular class or group of taxpayers from its neighbors by offering
them favors at the expense of the rest of its own taxpayers."
' See Palmolive Co. v. Conway, 43 F. (2d) 226 (W. D. Wis. 1930) ; Buick
Motor Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 48 F. (2d) 801 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931); Breck-
enridge, Tax Escape by Manipulations of Holding Company (1931) 9 N. C. L.
Rxv. 189; Magill; Allocation of Income by Corporate Contract (1931) 44
HAIv. L. REv. 935.
3 Governor Gardner speaking before the N. C. General Assembly: "Any
tax that we add to sales within the State helps to turn the scale against business
in North Carolina and in favor of business outside of North Carolina. I can
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to the consumer may find themselves losing business to out-of-state
competitors who find it profitable to conduct a mail-order business
with consumers in the taxing state, and if the local dealers, in order
to prevent this, pay the tax out of profits, this smaller margin of
profit will weaken their competitive position. A federal sales tax,
either general or on selected commodities, with an allowance of cred-
its for sales taxes paid to the states up to a certain percentage of the
federal tax would seem to be a solution to one problem of effective
sales tax administration.
Systems of taxation designed for isolated states are antiquated
today by an economic life which flows freely across state bound-
aries.3 4 The situation calls for concerted action by the governmental
units, and it seems that can best be accomplished through the guiding
influence of the federal government. It is not sufficient that the fed-
eral government satisfactorily finance the work delegated to it and
then leave the states to contest among themselves for revenue for
state purposes, when the federal government has the power to assist
in the creation of revenue systems which can cope with mobile tax
sources. The tobacco tax credit differs from other proposed federal
credits in that the benefits are for a smaller group of states. How-
ever, if it is granted that effective tax administration requires fed-
eral action, a tobacco credit would appear to have a proper place in
a general system of credits, and other states would receive compen-
satory benefits from similar credits. The tobacco credit may seem a
federal aid because federal grants may previously have been looked
upon as benevolences, but instead the credits would be a part of a
general plan of government finance. The tobacco tax is very profit-
ably handled by the federal government, but that government should
not overlook the needs of state and local government when it selects
sources of revenue. The credit is necessary to the wholesome exist-
ence of this remunerative tax source. It is questionable whether all
tobacco taxes are passed on to the consumer, or whether some are
not favor any system of taxation that imposes this additional burden on the
retail merchants of North Carolina, and that penalizes business within and
encourages business without the State." U. S. DAILY, March 26, 1931, at 205.
"The ideal relationship between federal, state and local revenue systems
is one of unity. The financial system of a nation should be highly if not com-
pletely, integrated. The revenue system should be under the control of a single
governmental unit-the national government-so as to secure uniformity of
laws, administration and burdens, and to make possible effective adjustment of
tax loads as changing economic conditions and governmental needs may re-
quire." Leland, The Relations of Federal, State and Local Finance. PROCEED-
INGs NATIOxAL TAX Asso. (1930) 94, 96.
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-not paid out of manufacturer's profits. If the latter is true, the fed-
,eral tax lessens the amount of tax which the manufacturing states
-can safely impose on the manufacturers. When the federal govern-
ment places a heavy tax on an industry, the industry's ability to pay
state taxes is decreased. Probably the stronger reason for the to-
bacco credit is the moral responsibility of the federal government,
which receives the largest benefit in the tobacco industry, to do all in
its power to see that the basic producers in this industry get a living
wage. This would not be a federal aid, but merely justice.
The constitutionality of the federal inheritance tax law contain-
ing the 80 per cent credit clause was upheld in Floridc v. Mellon.35
Florida asserted that the act was an invasion of the sovereign rights
of the state, an effort to coerce state legislation, and a violation of
the requirement that federal excises be uniform throughout the
United States. The United States Supreme Court replied: "The act
is a law of the United States made in pursuance of the Constitution
and, therefore, the supreme law of the land, the constitution or laws
of the States to the contrary notwithstanding. Whenever the con-
stitutional powers of the Federal government and those of the State
come into conflict the latter must yield." As to uniformity, the
Court said, "All that the Constitution (Art. I, §8, cI. 1) requires is
that the law shall be uniform in the sense that by its provisions the
-rule of liability shall be the same in all parts of the United States."
By the terms of the act the tax is uniform. Any departure from
uniformity comes about through dissimilar laws and conditions in
the states.
The inheritance tax credit and other credit plans are particularly
obnoxious to states' rights advocates. It is contended that they are
attempts of the federal government indirectly to determine state tax-
1273 U. S. 12, 47 Sup. Ct. 265, 71 L. ed. 511 (1927). Florida sought to
enjoin the Secretary of the Treasury and the Commissioner of Internal Rev-
enue from attempting to collect federal inheritance taxes in Florida. The
court denied the state leave to file the bill, and then continued to express an
opinion as to the constitutionality of the act. It is pointed out that if the court
-could not hear the case, the opinion on the constitutionality is not decision, but
dictum. Machen, The Strange Case of Florida v. Mellon (1928) 13 CORNELL
LAw QUARTEmY 351. The enunciation of the court in this case on the question
of uniformity has been cited in two cases, Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U. S. 101, 51
Sup. Ct. 58, 75 L. ed. 27 (1930) ; Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U. S. 589, 51
'Sup. Ct. 608, 75 L. ed. 791 (1931), and that Florida considers the case de-
cisive may be inferred from the subsequent action of. the state in modifying
its constitution to take advantage of the credit.
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ation policies which it cannot do directly.30 Certainly a system of
federal credits has that result, but it seems pertinent to question
whether the result is not justified in view of changing conditions of
economic life which make state areas too small for adequate admin-
istration of certain taxes. The growing integration of business de-
mands a corresponding integration of the fiscal structure.
E. M. PERKINS.
Banks and Banking-Liability to Statutory Assessment
Where Stock Held in Trust for Minors.
A transferred shares of bank stock to four persons to hold for the
benefit of minors. The transaction was recorded in the books of the
bank with the word "trustee" following the name of each of the
transferees. The trust was made in good faith, without any dis-
position to escape the statutory liability, and the trustees never had
any personal interest in the stock. The bank having become insol-
vent, recovery of the statutory assessment on the stock was denied
as against both the trustees personally and the estates of the minor
beneficiaries.1
At common law a trustee is personally liable on all contracts
made by him in the administration of the trust, unless his individual
liability is expressly excluded in the instrument. 2 Ordinarily the
word "trustee" appearing after the name is held to be merely de-
scriptive and insufficient to constitute an exclusion of personal re-
sponsibility.3 Under the general rule, the trustee is subject to
"Protests from 32 governors and 4,239 members of state legislatures were
filed in the Senate hearings when the increase of the inheritance credit from
25 per cent to 80 per cent was before the Finance Committee. These protests,
in the main, were against "the principle involved of having Congress dictate
to the States the rate and manner of levying taxes." HEARINGS ON THE REV-
ENUE BILL, SENATE FINANCE CommITTEE, January 9, 1926, at p. 47.
'Rutledge v. Stackley, 160 S. E. 429 (S. C. 1931).
2BoGERT, TRusTs (1921) 296; Scott, Liabilities Incurred in the Adminis-
tration of Trusts (1915) 28 HAgv. L. REv. 725.
'Flynn v. American Banking & Trust Co., 104 Me. 141, 69 Atl. 771 (1908);
BoGERT, TRusTs (1921) 296; Scott, op. cit. supra, at 738; Note (1928) 57 A.
L. R. 772; see American Trust Co. v. Jenkins, 193 N. C. 761, 138 S. E. 139
(1927) (beneficiary must be "named on record or in certificate"), ContrG:
Andrew v. Commercial Savings Bank, 205 Iowa 42, 217 N. W. 431, 57 A. L. R.
767 (1928) ; 6 THoMPsoN, CORPORATIONS (3rd ed. 1927) §4043.
The trustee is estopped to deny his liability where by his acts or representa-
tions he has purported to be the owner. Rust v. MacLaren, 29 F. (2d) 288
(1928); Chapman v. Pettus, 269 S. W. 268 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925); Kerr v.
Urie, 86 Md. 72, 37 Atl. 789, 38 L. R. A. 119 (1897). Massachusetts holds the
trustee personally responsible on his legal ownership regardless of notice of
the relationship existing. Commissioners v. Tremont Trust Co., 259 Mass. 16Z
156 N. E. 7 (1927) ; see Grew v. Breed, 10 Met. 569 (Mass. 1846).
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statutory liabilities imposed on stock, when he buys or holds shares
for the beneficiary.4 Although statutory provisions in most jurisdic-
tions shift this burden to the funds and estates in the trustee's hands,5
in South Carolina, where the principal case arose, there is no such
enactment. It is not clear, therefore, why there was no appeal in the
principal case from the master's report releasing those whose names
appeared on the books of the bank as holders of the stock. In the
absence of a specific statute or agreement, a creditor of a trust estate
may only reach the assets held for the beneficiaries where the trustee
is shown to. be unavailable or insolvent. 6 The principal case might
better have been placed upon this ground, for no statute or "agree-
ment was available. The statutes placing liability to assessment on
the trust estate list no exceptions and disregard possible disability
of the beneficiaries. 7 The decisions, however, seem to support the
principle case in holding, even under such legislation, that an estate
held for an infant beneficiary is exempt.8 The theory is that the
'Rosenberg v. Bennett, 35 Ga. App. 86, 132 S. E. 119 (1926) (purchase by
guardian); Foster v. Chase, 75 Fed. 797 (C. C. Vt. 1896); Furr v. Chapman,
276 S. W. 475 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) ; (1915) 28 HAzv. L. REv. 726.
The trustee remains liable, although after assessment but before filing of
suit the minor has legally affirmed, since the cause of action is deemed to have
arisen upon assessment, at which time the minor was incapable of assent.
Foster v. Wilson, 75 Fed. 797 (C. C. Vt. 1896).
12 U. S. C. A. §66; N. C. ANN. CODE: (Michie, 1931) §219 (c); GA. CoDE
ANN. (Michie, 1926) §2366 (140); CAHILL'S CONSOLmATED LAWS ov N. Y.
(1922) c. 3, §120; McNair v. Darragh, 31 F. (2d) 906 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929),
certiorari denied 280 U. S. 563, 50 Sup. Ct. 19, 74 L. ed. 617 (1929) ; Clay v.
Mobley, 171 Ga. 548, 156 S. E. 194 (1930); Fowler v. Gowing, 152 Fed. 801
(C. C. N. D. N. Y. 1907); Smathers v. Western Carolina Bank, 155 N. C. 283,
71 S. E. 345 (1911); Clark v. Ogilvie, 111 Ky. 181, 63 S. W. 429 (1901).
By illegal investment of trust funds the trustee makes himself personally
liable. Mobley v. Phinizy, 42 Ga. App. 33, 155 S. E. 73 (1930).
' Scott, loc. cit. supra note 2; Note (1931) 9 N. C. L. REV. 443; Roberts v.
Aberdeen-Southern Pines Syndicate, 198 N. C. 387, 157 S. E. 865 (1930).
' Witters v. Sowles, 35 Fed. 640 (C. C. Vt. 1888) (no capacity to act on part
of stockholder necessary).
Attempts to compare infants' liability to that of married women under
common law disability have been made, though the analogy has been expressly
repudiated. Foster v. Chase, supra note 4. Coverture is held to be no defense.
Chapman v. Pettus, 269 S. W. 268 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925); Bryan v. Bullock,
84 Fla. 179, 93 So. 182 (1922) ; Smathers v. Western Carolina Bank, supra note
5; Christopher v Norvell, 201 U. S. 216, 26 Sup. Ct. 502, 50 L. ed. 732 (1906) ;
Dickinson v. Traphagan, 147 Ala. 442, 41 So. 272 (1906) ; Keyser v. Hitz, 133
U. S. 138, 10 Sup. Ct. 290, 33 L. ed. 531 (1890); Witters v. Sowles, supra;
Bundy v. Cocke, 128 U. S. 185, 9 Sup. Ct. 242, 32 L. ed. 396 (1888) (suit in
equity).
' Commissioner v. Tremont Trust Co., supra note 3; 6 TfoMPsON, CORPOR-
ATIONS (3rd ed. 1927) §4899; see Mobley v. Phinizy, supra note 5; Mellott v.
Love, 152 Miss. 860, 119 So. 913 (1929).
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liability is contractual in character, 9 and subject to the minor's priv-
ilege of disaffirmance,' 0 which the law presumes to have been exer-
cised where the transaction has resulted to his detriment." Ordi-
narily, of course, the purchaser of bank stock is held to have assumed
the liability imposed by statute as a part of the consequences of the
purchase.1 2 There would seem to be no reason for implying any
less assumption of responsibility in the case of an accepted gift.18
And, as either the trustee or, as in the instant case, the creator of the
trust, as distinguished from the infant beneficiary, establishes the
stockholder relation with the bank, the reason for the privilege seems
hardly applicable.
The usual purpose underlying statutes imposing double liability
on stockholders is to protect creditors and depositors of the bank,14
and infants are not among the classes expressly excluded from re-
sponsibility. No personal judgment against the minors was involved
in the principal case, but merely a levy on holdings equitably held for
"Tunnicliffe v. Noyes, 135 So. 505 (Fla. 1931); Fischer v. Chisolm, 159
S. C. 395, 157 S. E. 139 (1931) (distinguished from penalty) ; Andrew v. State
Bank, 209 Iowa 1153, 229 N. W. 905 (1930) ; Austin v. Strong, 117 Tex. 263,
1 S. W. (2d) 872 (1928) ; Hirning v. Hamlin, 200 Iowa 1322, 206 N. W. 617
(1925) (held as obligatory as original obligation to -pay for the stock) ; Home
State Bank v. Swartz, 72 Mont. 425, 234 Pac. 281 (1925) (distinguished from
penal liability) ; Allen v. McFerson, 77 Cal. 186, 235 Pac. 346 (1925) ; Golden
v. Cervenka, 278 Ill. 409, 116 N. E. 273 (1917) ; Bernheimer v. Converse, 206
U. S. 516, 30 Sup. Ct. 409, 54 L. ed. 341 (1907) (Holmes, J., doubting result
here, finds difficulty in reconciling this case with McLaine v. Rankin, infra) ;
Myers v. Knickerbocker Trust Co., 71 C. C. A. 199, 139 Fed. 111 (1905);
Whitman v. Oxford Bank, 176 U. S. 559, 20 Sup. Ct. 477, 44 L. ed. 587 (1900);
Howarth v. Angle, 162 N. Y. 179, 56 N. E. 489 (1900); Witters v. Sowles,
supra note 7 (held similar to duty to pay taxes on the shares). But see Lange
v. Taylor, 40 S. W. (2d) 781 (Ark. 1931) ; McLaine v. Rankin, 197 U. S. 154,
25 Sup. Ct. 410, 49 L. ed. 702 (1905) (statute of limitations held to run as
against action to enforce statutory liability, not breach of contract); Cris-
topher v. Norvell, 201 U. S. 216, 26 Sup. Ct. 502, 50 L. ed. 732 (1906); Bryan
v. Bullock, 84 Fla. 179, 93 So. 182 (1922); Smathers v. Western Carolina
Bank, supra note 5; Aldrich v. Bingham, 131 Fed. 363 (W. D. N. Y. 1904).
"' Mellott v. Love, supra note 8 (infant's right to avoid contract held not
affected by supervention of rights of third parties).
IEarly v. Richardson, 280 U. S. 496, 50 Sup. Ct. 176, 74 L. ed. 575, 69
A. L. R. 658 (1930); Shaw v. McMillan, 24 S. W. (2d) 536 (Tex. Civ. App.
1930); Aldrich v. Bingham, supra note 9.
1 Howarth v. Angle, supra note 9; Tunnicliffe v. Noyes, supra note 9;
Chavous v. Gornto, 89 Fla. 12, 102 So. 754 (1925).
' Commissioner v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co., 253 Mass. 205, 148 N. E. 609,
41 A. L. R. 658 (1925). Liability has been imposed in the absence of actual
assent by the holder; Bain v. Rogers, 158 S. C. 417, 155 S. E. 619 (1930),
though usually acceptance must be shown; Shaw v. Rogers, 36 S. W. (2d) 533
(Tex. Civ. App. 1931) ; Wifters v. Sowles, supra note 7. See Bryan v. Bullock,
supra note 7.
2' American Trust Co. v. Jenkins, 193 N. C. 761, 138 S. E. 139 (1927).
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them. Hence the position taken by the dissenting opinion,' 5 that the
liability was entirely statutory, would seem from the standpoint of
accuracy and policy to be the more desirable. As the case stands,
with the trust estate, the former owner,16 and the trustees personally
all free from liability, it is difficult to see from what source the
bank's creditors are to seek relief.
JAMES M. LITTLE, JR.
Civil Procedure-Estoppel by Judgment.
Plaintiff broke his leg in an automobile accident. Defendants,
who attended his injury, brought suit for services rendered (although
not expressly stated in the report, it may fairly be inferred that the
plaintiff was not then aware of the extent of his injury) and re-
covered $525. Plaintiff later brought an action for malpractice in
not properly setting the bone. Held, that for physicians to recover in
their action for services it was necessary to allege and prove that the
services were rendered and were reasonably worth a certain amount,
therefore, the matter had been adjudicated and plaintiff is estopped
by the judgment from maintaining the suit.'
"The doctrine of estoppel as applied to judgments means that
when a fact has been agreed on, or decided in a court of record,
neither of the parties shall be allowed to call it in question and have it
tried over again at any time thereafter so long as the judgment stands
unreversed." 2 There are three views as to what matters are included
in the prior suit so as to estop the litigant 3 The strict view is that
only those matters which were actually presented by the pleadings and
determined by the issues are included in the estoppel. The liberal
view is that the estoppel includes not only matters actually determined
but all others which properly belong to the litigation and which might
have been determined by it. The intermediate view is that estoppel
includes what was actually raised by the pleadings or what might
properly have been predicated upon them, but not matters which
'By Cothran, J.
1 Cases in note 11 supra. The policy of requiring the liability incident to
ownership of the stock to be at all times attributable to some legally responsible
person has undoubtedly caused some injustice in cases of large scale trans.
actions carried out through the medium of brokers. This rule is more ex-
tensively followed in England.
' Garrett v. Kendrick, 201 N. C. 388, 160 S. E. 349 (1931).
'MCINTOSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1929) §657; Arm-
field v. Moore, 44 N. C. 157, 161 (1851).
'2 BLACK ON JUDGMENTS (1891) §614; McINxosH, op cit., sufpra note 2,
§659.
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might have been brought into them. Although the language of some
of the North Carolina cases is that of the broad view, the decisions
and the language of most of the cases show that this state has
accepted the intermediate view.4 It seems that some doubt might
arise as to whether the intermediate view is broad enough to include
the matters in the principle case since there is no reference in the
pleading to any malpractice.
A clear understanding of the court's decision in this type of case
can be reached only after an understanding of the remedies of recoup-
ment and counter-claim. Counter-claim. is a code remedy being un-
known at common law except as represented by a cross bill in equity.8
It includes both recoupment and set-off.6 The latter two remedies
may become counter-claims depending on how they are used by the
defendant. If used in the nature of a defense to defeat a part or
all of a plaintiff's claim they retain their original character of either
recoupment or set-off. But, if an affirmative judgment is sought in
excess of plaintiff's claim then either may become a counter-claim. 7
The general rule in North Carolina is that a counter-claim may or
may not be pleaded at the option of the defendant and failure to so
plead will not estop him from bringing an independent suit.8 Re-
coupment on the other hand is a common law remedy in the nature
of a defense in that the matter sought to be used must have arisen
in the same transaction as the plaintiff's claim and could be used at
most only to defeat plaintiff's claim, no excess judgment being al-
lowed.9 If the claimant did not set it up it was lost since it was so
'Piedmont Wagon Co. v. Byrd, 119 N. C. 460, 26 S. E. 144 (1896); Dur-
ham Consolidated Land Co. v. Guthrie, 123 N. C. 185, 31 S. E. 601 (1898);
Case Manufacturing Co. v. Moore, 144 N. C. 527, 57 S. E. 213, 10 L. R. A.(N. S.) 734, 119 Am. St. Rep. 983 (1907) ; Moore v. Haskins, 179 N. C. 167,
101 S. E. 564 (1919); Poison v. Strickland, 193 N. C. 299, 136 S. E. 873(1927) ; Price v. Edwards, 178 N. C. 493, 101 S. E. 33 (1919) ; Stelges v. Sim-
mons, 170 N. C. 42, 86 S. E. 801 (1915) Coltrane v. Laughlin, 157 N. C. 282,
72 S. E. 961 (1911) ; Shakespeare v. Caldwell Land & Lumber Co., 144 N. C.
516, 57 S. E. 213 (1907); Tyler v. Capeheart, 125 N. C. 64, 34 S. E. 108(1899) ; Tuttle v. Harvill, 85 N. C. 456 (1880) ; Roberts v. Pratt, 158 N. C.
50, 73 S. E. 129 (1911) ; Williams v. Clouse, 91 N. C. 322 (1884).
'34 Cyc. 642 (1910) ; MCINTOsH, op. cit. supra note 2, §463.
'Hurst v. Everett, 91 N. C. 399 (1884); McINTosH, NORT CAROLINA
PRACtiCE AND PROCEDURE (1929) §463; PoamEoy, CODE REmE iEs (5th ed.
1929) §613.
' Hurst v. Everett, 91 N. C. 399 (1884); 34 Cyc. 642 (1910) ; McIlTosH,
op. cit. supra note 2, §463.
'Woody v. Jordan, 69 N. C. 189 (1872); Francis v. Edwards, 77 N. C. 272(1876) ; Mooney v. Hamilton, 132 N. C. 303, 43 S. E. 903 (1902) ; Trust Co.
v. McKinnie, 179 N. C. 328, 102 S. E. 385 (1920).
'Hurst v. Everett, 91 N. C. 399 (1884); PomERoy, op. cit. supra note 6,§607; 34 Cyc. 642 (1910).
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intimately related to plaintiff's claim that it must necessarily be drawn
into controversy.' 0 As pointed out above, this is not the rule as to
counter-claim generally." However, one other case has been decided
in North Carolina under the code practice in which the rule of re-
coupment was retained. -2 So that this case and the principle case
must have been governed by the common law conception of recoup-
ment rather than that of the modem code remedy of counter-claim.
It might be questioned whether the application of the common law
rule as to the use and effect of recoupment should be applied strictly
under the more liberal code practice as to counter-claim. The policy
of the rule is undoubtedly to prevent multiplicity of suits, yet this
case shows that it will work a great hardship when defendant does
not know the extent of his injury at the time he is sued by the
physician for services.
DALLACE MCLENNAN.
Copyrights-Radio Broadcasting-Infringement by
Reception of Musical Composition.
Out of the continued development of radio broadcasting has arisen
the question whether the reception' by radio of a broadcast musical
composition will constitute an infringement of the copyright of the
composition. This problem was first presented for decision in a Fed-
eral District Court of Missouri.2 A hotel in Kansas City had in-
stalled a master radio receiving set which actuated loud-speakers
placed in both the public and private rooms. A broadcast program
received by the master set was thus available to guests throughout the
hotel. A Kansas City broadcasting station, without license from the
copyright owners, transmitted a copyrighted musical composition.
Without any pre-arrangement between the broadcaster and the hotel
proprietor, the broadcast composition was received on the master set
34 Cyc. 623 (1910) ; Po~moy, op. cit. supra note 6, §607.
' See note 8, supra.
Allen v. Sally, 179 N. C. 147, 101 S. E. 545 (1919).
1It is now settled that the broadcasting of a copyrighted musical com-
position without the consent of the copyright owners constitutes infringement.
Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. American Automobile Accessories Co., 5 F. (2d)
411, 40 A. L. R. 1511- (C. C. A. 6th, 1925), certiorari denied, 269 U. S. 556, 46
Sup. Ct 19, 70 L. ed. 409 (1925) ; Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. General Electric
Co., 16 F. (2d) 829 (S. D. N. Y., 1926); Messager v. British Broadcasting
Co., Ltd., [1927] 2 K. B. 543, rev'd as to another point, [1928] 1 K. B. 660,
[1929] A. C. 151; (1927) 75 U. OF PA. L. Rnv. 549; Davis, Copyright and Radio,(1929) 16 VA. L. REv. 40.
'Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., 32 F. (2d) 366 (W. D. Mo. 1929).
This decision was only the first stage in the litigation. Infrl note 5.
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and heard by guests of the hotel. The copyright owners sued for an
injunction and damages. The basis of their action was the Copyright
Act of 1909,3 which provides, among other things, that the owner of
the copyright of a musical composition shall have the exclusive right
to perform it publicly for profit.4 The outcome of the litigation,
which has thus far progressed through four stages, is that the acts
of the hotel proprietor are held to constitute a "public performance
for profit," and an infringement of the copyright.5
If liability for infringement is to be predicated on reception, it
must first appear that the reception constituted a "public performance
for profit." Therefore, one who, in his own residence, receives by
radio and makes audible to friends a broadcast composition is not an
infringer.6
The determination of whether the acts of the hotel in the prin-
cipal case were public or for profit presented little difficulty in view
of existing authority.7 The work of providing entertainment for the
many guests of a city hotel seems clearly "public." Further, while
it is true that the hotel did not receive, or expect to redeive, any
direct compensation for the item of "music" as such, it did, un-
questionably, anticipate an indirect profit from the entertainment of
its guests. And the Supreme Court has held indirect profit sufficient
to bring the acts within the purview of the statute.8 There thus
335 STAT. 1075 (1909), 17 U. S. C. A. §1 (e) (1927).
""Any person entitled thereto, upon complying with the provisions of this
title, shall have the exclusive right: ... (e) To perform the copyrighted work
publicly for profit if it be a musical composition and for the purpose of pub-
lic performance for profit."
'The progress of the litigation has been as follows: (1) The District Court
held that the hotel -proprietor had not infringed the copyright. Buck v. Jewell-
La Salle Realty Co., op. cit. supra note 2; commented on in (1930) 9 ORL. L.
Rav. 182. (2) Plaintiffs appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals which, being
in doubt on the question of "performance," certified that issue to the Supreme
Court. (3) It was there held that the acts of. the hotel proprietor did con-
stitute "performance." Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., 283 U. S. 191, 51
Sup. Ct. 410, 75 L. ed. 971 (1931) ; commented on in (1931) 26 ILL. L. Rav.
443. (4) The Circuit Court of Appeals then proceeded with the case, and held
this "performance' to be "public" and "for profit." Buck v. Jewell-La Salle
Realty Co., 51 F. (2d) 726 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931).
' See Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., op. cit. supra note 5, at 196, 51
Sup. Ct. at 411, 75 L. ed. at 975.
" The terms "public" and "for profit" have received liberal construction.
Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U. S. 591, 37 Sup. Ct. 232, 61 L. ed. 511 (1917) ;
M. Witmark & Sons v. L. Bamberger & Co., 291 Fed. 776 (D. N. J. 1923).
'Herbert v. Shanley Co., op. cit. supra note 7. See Remick v. Accessories
Co., op. cit. supra note 1, at 411, 40 A. L. R. at 1513, where it is said: "It
suffices that the purpose of the performance be for profit, and not eleemosynary;
it is against a commercial, as distinguished from a purely philanthropic, public
use of another's composition, that the statute is directed."
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remains the issue of performance. In deciding it, the Supreme Court
considered the function of the radio receiver. Mr. Justice Brandeis
demonstrated that radio reception does not constitute mere audition;
but reproduction: just as a phonograph record requires a separate
mechanism (the phonograph) for the reproduction of the recorded
composition, so radio waves require an instrument (the receiver) for
their transformation into audible sound waves.9 "Reproduction in
both cases amounts to performance." Intention to perform the copy-
righted composition is not necessary in order for liability for infringe-
ment to attach; therefore, the hotel "performed" even though it
had no control over the selection of the broadcast program.' 0
Shortly after the first decision in the litigation of the principal
case, there arose in California another case which involved infringe-
ment by reception-that of Buck v. Debaum."1 A cafe owner re-
ceived and made audible to guests in his cafe a musical composition
which had been broadcast dth the consent of the copyright owners.
It was held that there was no infringement, for the reason that,
having regularly licensed the broadcaster, the copyright owners would
be regarded as having impliedly licensed the commercial reception of
the program by any person. It is interesting to speculate as to what
the Supreme Court would have held regarding performance, if the
broadcaster in the hotel case had been licensed by the copyright
owners. While the court does hold that the copyright monopolies are
not necessarily exhausted with the -broadcasting of the composition,12
thus indicating that there might be as many "performances" as there
were parties receiving the composition, there is a suggestion by Mr.
Justice Brandeis that Buck v. Debaum might have been followed, and
a license for reception implied.' 8
' "The guests of the hotel hear a reproduction brought about by the acts of
the hotel in (1) installing, (2) supplying electric current to, and (3) operating
the radio receiving set and loud-speakers. There is no difference in substance
between the case where a hotel engages an orchestra to furnish the music and
that where, by means of the radio set and loud-speakers here employed, it
furnishes the same music for the same purpose." Mr. Justice Brandeis in Buck
v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., op. cit. supra note 5, at 201, 51 Sup. Ct. at 413, 75
L. ed. at 978.
" The Supreme Court reversed the holding of the- District Court (Buck v.
Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., op. cit. supra note 2) that infringement must be
an intentional performance, as where one plays a phonograph record.
u Buck v. Debaum, 40 F. (2d) 734 (S. D. Cal. 1929).
'Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., op. cit. supra note 5, at 197, 51 Sup.
Ct. at 411, 75 L. ed. at 976.
"Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., op. cit. supra note 5, at 198, footnote
5, 51 Sup. Ct. at 412, footnote 5, 75 L. ed. at 976, footnote 5.
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The principal case, while logically construing the statute, arrives
at a regrettable result. The proprietors of a great many stores,
hotels, and restaurants utilize radio reception for the diversion of
their guests. The enforcement of the copyright law against such
parties will be a most difficult, if not impossible, task, and because of
their lack of control of the broadcast programs, an unfair one. A
writer in the December, 1931, issue of the Illinois Law Review 14
suggests that because of the obstacles in the path of the administra-
tion of a law so construed, and because of the "prolific and vexatious
litigation" that is likely to follow, the desirable course is to declare
the copyright monopolies exhausted with the performance of the
broadcaster. The copyright owner, in such an event, would be
afforded sufficient protection by making allowance, in the fee charged
the broadcaster, for the possibility of commercial reception.15 Policy
demands such a conclusion. Were it embodied in legislation, a com-
mendable step would be made toward dispensing with the necessity
of settling controversies connected with copyright and broadcasting
by reference to a statute which was enacted many years before radio
broadcasting developed,1 6 and which is thus wholly inadequate in its
contemplation of the contemporary scene. 1
Wm. ADAmS, JR.
Criminal Procedure-Motion for New Trial After
Conviction Affirmed on Appeal.
The question whether the Superior Courts in North Carolina have
the power to grant a new trial in a capital case on the ground of
newly discovered evidence after a verdict of guilty has been affirmed
on appeal was presented for the first time in State v. Casey.' The
court in a three to two decision ruled in the affirmative.
The common law rule was that the courts could not grant new
trials in criminal cases involving felonies.2 The reason assigned was
1 (1931) 26 ILL L. Rav. 443.
"' Mr. Justice Brandeis alludes to this possibility in the court's opinion.
Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., op. cit. supra note 5, at 199, 51 Sup. Ct. at
412, 75 L. ed. at 976.
" The Act was passed in 1909. Radio broadcasting on a commercial scale
is said to have commenced in 1920. Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., op.
cit. supra note 5, at 196, footnote 2, 51 Sup. Ct. at 411, footnote 2, 75 L. ed. at
97, footnote 2.
(1931) 26 ILL. L. Rav. 443, at 444.1201 N. C. 620, 161 S. E. 81 (1931).
State v. Turner, 143 N. C. 641, 57 S. E. 158 (1907) ; 16 C. J. 2615 (1918);
UNDEanH.L, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE (3rd ed) §785 (1912).
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that executive clemency was always open to one who thought himself
unjustly convicted 3  The common law rule has been changed in
practically all of the states, including North Carolina, by statutes
which usually fix a definite time limit within which such a motion
must be made.4 The North Carolina statute5 has no such time-fixing
element. It provides that "The courts may grant new trials in crim-
inal cases when the defendant is found guilty, under the same rules
and regulations as in civil cases." Despite the seeming dearness of
the statute, the practice in criminal cases has differed in two im-
portant respects from the practice in civil cases.
In civil cases a motion for a new trial on the ground of newly dis-
covered evidence can be made in the Superior Court during the trial
term.6 On appeal the motion can be made in the Supreme Court until
the judgment there has been certified down.7 Afterwards the motion
can only be made in the Superior Court at the next term before final
judgment has been rendered. "
In criminal cases the motion can be made in the Superior Court
during the trial term as in civil cases.9 On appeal the Supreme Court
has consistently refused to entertain such a motion, 0 and the trial
court is without jurisdiction, as the case is not then pending in that
court. 1 After affirmance and certification down, in cases less than
capital, the practice has been for the trial court to entertain the
motion.' 2 In capital cases the prevailing view seems to have been
that no such motion could be made.
The reasons assigned for the refusal of the Supreme Court to
entertain motions in criminal cases are: (1) that the statute was in-
' State v. Turner, supra note 2.
'FLA. COmP. LAws (1927) §4497 (four days); GA. CODE ANN. (Michie,
1926) §1090 (thirty days); IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1926) §2325 (thirty
days); N. Y. CRIM. CODE (Gilbert, 1929) §466 (one year).
'N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §4644.
' England v. Duckworth, 75 N. C. 309 (1875) ; Stilley v. Goldsboro Plan-
ing Mills Co., 161 N. C. 517, 77 S. E. 760 (1913).
'Turner v. Davis, 132 N. C. 187, 43 S. E. 637 (1903); Chrisco v. Yow, 153
N. C. 434, 69 S. E. 422 (1910).
'Black v. Black, 111 N. C. 300, 16 S. E. 412 (1892) ; Allen v. Gooding, 174
N. C. 271, 93 S. E. 740 (1917).
' State v. Trull, 169 N. C. 363, 85 S. E. 133 (1915) ; State v. Hartsfield,
188 N. C. 357, 124 S. E. 629 (1924) ; State v. Jackson, 199 N. C. 321, 154 S. E.
402 (1930).
" State v. Starnes, 94 N. C. 973 (1885) ; State v. Lilliston, 141 N. C. 857,
54 S. E. 427 (1906) ; State v. Griffin, 190 N. C. 133, 129 S. E. 410 (1925).
'Bledsoe v. Nixon, 69 N. C. 82 (1873); State v. Casey 201 N. C. 185
(1931).
"State v. Casey, supra note 1, at p. 627.
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tended to refer only to the trial courts, since it is placed under the
heading "Trial, Superior Courts" ;18 (2) that the constitution confers
upon the Supreme Court the power to review the decisions of the
lower courts only upon matters of law and legal inference ;14 (3) that,
since the governor has the pardoning power, there is no necessity
for an assumption of the power.1' It is worthy of note that the
leading decisions on this point were by a divided court.16
In reaching the decision in the instant case the court had to over-
rule the prevailing view that the Superior Courts could not entertain
a motion for new trial in a capital case after affirmance on appeal.
Only one case has been found involving this point, and there the trial
court asserted it had the power to entertain the motion, though refus-
ing it on the merits. 17 Since thig" decision in 1886 two statutory
changes have modified the procedure.' 8  One of these statutes pro-
vides that upon affirmance on appeal in a capital case, execution shall
take place on the third Friday after the filing of the opinion of the
Supreme Court.' 9 The contention of the dissenting judges in the
instant case was that this statute was a limitation of the power con-
ferred -by the statute making procedure as to new trials in criminal
cases conform to that in civil cases. The majority opinion took the
view that such a construction would violate the constitutional guar-
anty of the equal protection of the laws2 0 by refusing to one convicted
of a capital offense the right to move for a new trial after appeal,
although such a right remains to one convicted of a lesser offense.
The result reached in the instant case seems desirable, though it
is to be doubted whether a contrary result would have violated the
13N. C. CODS ANN. (Michie, 1931) §§4632-4646; State v. Lilliston, supra
note 10.
'IN. C. CoNsT., art. 4, §8; State v. Starnes, supra note 10. In State v.
Lilliston, supra note 10, at 867, Chief Justice Clark speaking for the court,
says: "Motion for new trials for newly discovered evidence were equitable
in their nature and did not extend to criminal actions until §3272 of the Re-
visal (now C. S. 4644), which extended the power only to the Superior
Courts."
State v. Lilliston, .supra note 10; State v. Turner, supra note 2.
State v. Lilliston, supra note 10 (three to two); State v. Turner, supra
note 2 (three to two) ; State v. Arthur, 151 N. C. 653, 65 S. E. 758 (1909)
(four to one).
I State v. Starnes, 97 N. C. 423, at p. 428 (1886).
1N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §4654 (providing that an appeal shall
not be construed as vacating the judgment of the trial court, as had been the
practice); N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §4663.
" N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §4663.
' U. S. CoxsT., Amend. 14.
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constitutional amendment as to the equal protection of the laws.2 1
It would seem unjust to limit one convicted of a capital offense to an
appeal for pardon, while one convicted of a lesser offense has the
additional right of a motion for new trial. Before the governor the
prisoner is presumed to be guilty, while in a trial he has the benefit
of a presumption of innocence. Furthermore, a pardon, if granted,
does not carry the same mark of innocence as does an acquittal by
a jury.
The principal case brings the procedure in criminal cases one step
nearer to that in civil cases. The only remaining difference is that
the Supreme Court will not entertain motions for new trials in
criminal cases, while it will do so in civil cases. It seems unlikely that
the court will reverse itself on that point, in view of the long line of
decisions, and the practical obstacles presented above. Such a change,
if desirable, could better be accomplished by a constitutional amend-
ment.
ROBERT A. Hovis.
Federal Procedure-Injunction Against
Judgment of State Court.
The defendant, in violation of a written contract of employment
with the plaintiff, started suit for personal injuries in a state court
against a railroad over which the plaintiff ran its trains. The plain-
tiff, since by contract it had to hold the railroad harmless, filed this
suit in a federal court to enjoin the defendant from proceeding.
Held: Injunction granted to stay the execution of judgment if
rendered.1
The Federal Judicial Code, since 1793, has provided that "The
writ of injunction shall not be granted by any court of the United
States to stay the proceedings in any court of a state, except in cases
where such injunction shall be authorized by any law relating to
bankruptcy." 2
1 The construction given this Amendment by the United States Supreme
Court allows for a "reasonable classification." Thus, so long as all capital
offenders have the same right it seems that the equal protection of the laws
would not be denied. In Bowman v. Lewis, 101 U. S. 22 (1880), the Court
says, the Fourteenth Amendment "has respect to persons and classes of per-
sons. It means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same
protection of the laws which is enjoyed by other persons in the same place
and under like circumstances. . . .Each state prescribes its own mode of
judicial proceeding."
'Western Union v. Tompa, 51 F. (2d) 1032 (C. C. A. 9th 1931).
'36 STAT. 1162 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A. §379 (1928).
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Some courts hold that this prohibits the enjoining of the prosecu-
tion of proceedings of state courts at any stage,8 unless the suit
relates to bankruptcy. Others, however, narrow its restrictions so as
to allow a federal court to prevent the institution of proceedings to
enforce statutes contrary to the Constitution of the United States ;4 or
to stay the proceedings in a state court when the rightful jurisdiction
of the federal courts is being disregarded,u or when property in the
custody of the federal court is being interfered with by proceedings
in the state courts,6 or when the state court denies the removal to the
federal court of a cause that is by law removable.7 There are still
others that take a middle ground, and, while they will not enjoin
the prosecution of judicial proceedings, will stay the issuance of an
execution after judgment, if the judgment has been secured by
fraud,8 or is void,9 or ought not according to good conscience be
'Chapman v. Brewer, 114 U. S. 158, 5 Sup. Ct. 799, 29 L. ed. 83 (1885) ;
Fenwick Hall Co. v. Old Saybrook, 66 Fed. 389 (C. C. D. Conn. 1895) ; Security
Trust Co. v. Union Trust Co., 134 Fed. 301 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1904) ; Leathe v.
Thomas, 97 Fed. 136 (C. C. A. 7th 1899) ; Southern Bank and Trust Co., v.
Falsom, 75 Fed. 929 (C. C. A. 6th 1896).4 Mo. v. B. & Q. R. Co., 241 U. S. 333, 36 Sup. Ct. 715 (1916) ; Pheonix
Ry. v. Geary, 239 U. S. 277, 36 Sup. Ct. 45, 60 L. ed. 287 (1915) ; Minn. Brew-
ery Co. v. McGillivray, 104 Fed. 258 (C. C. D. S. D. 1900)
Contra: Rensselear & S. R. Co. v. Bennington & R. R. Co., 18 Fed. 617
(C. C. D. Vt. 1883) ; Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197, 44 Sup. Ct. 15, 68
L. ed. 255 (1923).
'French v. Hay, 22 Wall. (U. S.) 250, 22 L. ed. 875 (1875); Terre Haute
& I. R. Co. v. Peoria & P. U. R. Co., 82 Fed. 943 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1897);
Riverdale Cotton Mills v. Ala. etc. Mfg. Co., 111 Fed. 431 (C. C. N. D. Ga.
1901) ; Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. McCabe, 213 U. S. 207, 29 Sup. Ct. 430,
53 L. ed. 735 (1908).
Oppenheimer v. San Antonio Land & Irrigation Co., 246 Fed. 934 (C. C.
A. 5th 1917) ; Havner v. Hegnes, 269 Fed. 537 (C. C. A. 8th 1920).
'U. S. v. Brown, 281 Fed. 657 (C. C. A. 8th 1922); Jessup v. Wabash,
St. L. & P. Ry. Co., 44 Fed. 663 (C. C. N. D. Ohio 1890).
'Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U. S. 589, 12 Sup. Ct. 62, 35 L. ed. 870 (1891)
(plaintiff introduced forged letter in evidence) ; Hewitt v. Hewitt, 17 F. (2d)
716 (C. C. A. 9th 1927) (widow did not disclose to adm'r that husband had an
adopted son) ; Chicago, R. I. & R. R. Co. v. Callicotte, 267 Fed. 799 (C. C. A.
8th 1920), 16 A. L. R. 386 (1922) (plaintiff produced temporary paralysis by
artificial means and secured judgment for injuries) ; Lehman v. Graham, 135
Fed. 39 (C. C. A. 5th 1905) (holder of note secured by mortgage collected note
then secured judgment for foreclosure on mortgage).
' Several states have statutes which provide that service of process upon a
certain state official shall be deemed to be service upon a foreign corporation,
if that corporation has no agent upon which process may be served. The fol-
lowing cases hold that judgment by default where process was not actually
served upon the defendants was void regardless of the statute. Simon v. Sou.
Ry., 195 Fed. 56 (C. C. A. 5th 1912) ; Aff'd on appeal, 236 U. S. 115, 35 Sup.
Ct. 255, 59 L. ed. 492 (1915) ; Nat. Surety v. State Bank, 120 Fed. 593 (C. C.
A. 8th 1903) ; Joseph Reid Gas Engine Co. v. Exchange Nat. Bank, 281 Fed.
847 (W. D. La. 1912); Mohawk Oil Co. v. Layne, 270 Fed. 841 (W. D. La.
1921).
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enforced. 10  The instant case falls in this last class. But the courts
uniformly agree that such relief will not be given after the writ of
execution has reached the sheriff."1
This statute, if taken literally, plainly deprives the federal courts
of the power to enjoin the prosecution of proceedings in any state
court, regardless of any notions of equity or justice. Probably some
liberality of construction is justified by the change in attitude towards
the relations between the state and federal courts since 1793. But
the instant case, by staying the enforcement of a judgment before that
judgment is secured, is going very far. Regardless of how desirable
a more extensive jurisdiction might be the change should be left to
Congress.
WILLIAM MEDFORD.
Federal Procedure-Test of Jurisdictional Amount
in Injunction Cases.
Plaintiff, a Massachusetts corporation, owning a hunting pre-
serve valued in excess of $50,000, the chief utility of which was for
shooting wild fowl, sought an injunction in a federal court to re-
strain poaching by the defendants, citizens of North Carolina. Held,
since the defendants' acts were such as substantially to destroy the
chief utility of the land, the requisite jurisdictional amount of $3,000
is involved.'
The mere fact that a suit involves diversity of citizenship does
not confer jurisdiction on a federal court.2 There must be involved
Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor, 254 U. S. 175, 41 Sup. Ct. 93, 65 L. ed.
205 (1920) (facts almost identical with those in instant case except judgment
bad already been obtained) ; Pierce v. Nat. Bank of Commerce, 268 Fed. 487
(C. C. A. 8th 1920) (defendant after realizing money from collateral secured
judgment in the state court on obligation) ; Fetzer v. Johnson, 15 F. (2d) 145(C. C. A. 8th 1926) (defendant who had enjoyed the benefit of an improvement
to be paid for out of an assessment upon lands benefitted, secured judgment
setting aside assessment on his lands on grounds of technicality in making the
assessment).
But the courts will not enjoin a mere irregularity in procedure. Lauder-
dale Co. v. Forster, 23 Fed. 516 (C. C. W. D. Tenn. 1885) ; or for error in con-
struction or application of law, 'Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 268 Fed.
30 (C. C. A. 8th 1920); Wagner Electric Mfg. Co. v. Lyndon, 282 Fed. 219
(C. C. A. 8th 1922).
, Mills v. Provident Life & Trust Co., 100 Fed. 344 (C. C. A. 9th 1900);
Leathe v. Thomas, 97 Fed. 136 (C. C. A. 7th 1899); Fenwick Hall Co. v.
Old Saybrood, supra note 3; Security Trust Co. v. Union Trust Co., supra
note 3. See DoBIF, FEuRAL PROCEDURE (1928) 676.1 Swan Island Club v. Ansell, 51 F. (2d) 337 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931).
'Ingrain Day Lumber Co. v. United States Shipping Board Emergency
Fleet Corporation, 267 Fed. 283 (S. D. Miss. 1920).
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in addition an amount in excess of $3,000, exclusive of interests and
costs.3 This applies to suits in equity as well as to actions at law.4
There seems to be no clearly defined method used in arriving at the
amount in controversy, due mostly to ambiguous language continually
employed by the majority of the courts. This ambiguity is especially
rife in suits for injunction. In the main, though indistinctly, five
tests have been resorted to.
First, the court may be confronted with a situation in which the
plaintiff has a definite subject matter which he seeks to protect from
the acts of the defendant. If the subject matter is capable of eval-
uation, it will determine the amount in controversy.5 Thus, when
it is a tract of land, and the defendant's acts cause a permanent in-
jury to that land, the value of the land will be the chief factor.6
Where the suit is to enjoin unlawful interference with the plaintiff's
business, the value of that business will be the amount in con-
troversy.7 And where the plaintiff seeks to restrain the infringe-
ment of a trade-mark, the court will look at the value of that trade-
mark.
The second method employed is collateral to the first. Where
there is a definite subject matter to be protected, the cases in this
group determine the amount in controversy not only by the value of
the subject matter to be protected, but proceed one step further and
add the amount of pecuniary damages which the plaintiff has already
sustained.9 Thus, where the plaintiff seeks to protect a flume, the
amount in controversy would be the value of the flume plus the dam-
336 STAT. 1087 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A. §292 (1927).
'Farmers and Merchants Bank of Monroe, N. C. v. Federal Reserve Bank
of Richmond, 274 Fed. 235 (W. D. N. C. 1921).
'Louisville R. Co. v. Bitterman, 144 Fed. 34 (C. C. A. 5th, 1907), aff'd.,
207 U. S. 205, 28 Sup. Ct. 91, 52 L. ed. 171, 12 ANN. CAS. 693 (1907) (scalping
of nontransferable round trip tickets at a reduced fare); Texas R. Co. v.
Bitterman, 144 Fed. 46 (C. C. A. 5th, 1906) (same); Harris v. Brown, 6 F.(2d) 922 (W. D. Ky. 1925) (suit to enjoin directors of corporation from
doing harmful and illegal acts).
'Swan Island Club v. Ansell, mipra note 1; In re Turner, 119 Fed. 231
(C. C. S. D. Iowa 1902); Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Cunningham, 103 Fed.
708 (C. C. S. D. Wash. 1900); Smith v. Bivens, 56 Fed. 352 (C. C. D. S. C.
1893) ; Fidler v. Roberts, 41 F. (2d) 305 (C. C. A. 7th, 1930) ; Port of Seattle
v. Oregon & W. R. Co., 242 Fed. 986 (W. D. Wash. 1917).
'Lambert v. Yellowley, 4 F. (2d) 915 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1925), aff'd., 272
U. S. 581, 47 Sup. Ct. 210 (1926) ; American Fisheries Co. v. Lennen, 118 Fed.
869 (C. C. D. Conn. 1902); Campbell Baking Co. v. City of Maryville, 31 F.
(2d) 466 (W. D. Mo. 1929).
"Hennessy v. Hermann, 89 Fed. 669 (C. C. N. D. Cal. 1898).
'Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Mills, 222 Fed. 481 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915) (suit to
restrain railroad company from taking right of way).
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age already done to it.1o The plaintiff under this method obviously
has a better chance to stay in court than under the first, though the
difference in many instances would prove to be negligible.
Cases employing the third method proceed on the basis of pros-
pective damage to the plaintiff, were the injunction not granted. It
is in this group that ambiguity is most prevalent. The language of
the courts deals with rights and their supposed values, the amount
in controversy being the value of the right which the plaintiff seeks
to protect," which in effect is equivalent, in a pecuniary sense at
least, to the prospective damage to the plaintiff should the injunction
not issue. However, most courts refrain from using the latter lan-
guage. The right of the plaintiff to conduct his business free from
unlawful interference12 would perhaps be equal to the damages
which he would sustain if the defendant's interference were not en-
joined. Likewise, the value of the plaintiff's right to restrain the
enforcement of an order by the railroad commission, reducirig his
rates,13 would be the amount of damage he will sustain if the order
is enforced. And in a suit to enjoin the collection of a tax, the right
has the identical evaluation as the plaintiff's prospective damage, i.e.,
the amount of the tax,14 and in a few cases, that amount plus the
immediate damages which the tax will probably occasion, such as the
extinction of a business.' 5 Most cases, however, refuse to go beyond
the amount of the tax.16 Some of the courts in this third group do
not camouflage what they really mean with a discussion of rights,
but attack the problem in an understandable way by asking them-
selves directly the question as to how much damage the plaintiff
would sustain were the injunction not to issue.1 7
10 Maffet v. Quine, 95 Fed. 199 (C. C. D. Ore. 1899).
u Packard v. Banton, 264 U, S. 140, 44 Sup. Ct. 257, 68 L. ed. 596 (1924)
(suit to restrain enforcement of unconstitutional statute); Sun Maid Raisin
Growers of California v. Avis, 25 F. (2d) 303 (N. D. Ill. 1928) (suit
to restrain infringement of a trade-mark); Del Monte Special Food Co. v.
California Packing Corporation, 34 F. (2d) 774 (C. C. A. 9th, 1929) (suit to
restrain unfair competition) ; General Petroleum Corporation of California v.
Beanblossom, 47 F. (2d) 826 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931).
' Mutual Oil Co. v. Zehrung, 11 F. (2d) 887 (D. Neb. 1925) (suit to enjoin
municipal corporation from competing with plaintiff in selling gasoline).
Illinois Central R. Co. v. Kentucky Railroad Commission, 1 F. (2d) 805
(E. D. Ky. 1924).
I" Bank of Arizona v. Howe, 293 Fed. 600 (D. Ariz. 1923).
'St. Louis S. W. R. Co. v. Emmerson, 30 F. (2d) 322 (C. C. A. 7th,
1929) ; Gallardo v. Questrell, 29 F. (2d) 897 (C. C. A. 1st, 1928).
"' Turner v. Jackson Lumber Co., 159 Fed. 923 (C. C. A. 5th, 1908) (tax on
land); Purnell v. Page, 128 Fed. 496 (C. C. E. D. N. C. 1903) (personal tax
constituting cloud on title to realty).
'TFjardo Sugar Co. of Porto Rico v. Holcomb, Auditor, 16 F. (2d) 92
(C. C. A. 1st, 1926) (suit to enjoin a re-audit of plaintiff's books to ascertain
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The fourth method is complementary to the third. The amount
in controversy is determined on the basis of prospective damage plus
past damage.' 8 Where the suit is to enjoin the enforcement of illegal
regulations, costing the plaintiff $1,600 annually, the amount involved
is the damage the plaintiff has already sustained plus that which he
will probably sustain in the future. 19
The procedure of the fifth group is an unqualified and clean-cut
departure from that adopted by the other four groups in that it views
the situation from the defendant's side, the amount involved being
determined by the prospective damage to the defendant in case the
injunction should issue.20 These cases sometimes involve a nuisance
situation, the value of the property or activity resulting in the nui-
sance being the amount in controversy.21 The reason for this inverse
procedure is made apparent when it is disclosed that in these cases
the plaintiff's right is either negligible or incapable of evaluation.
To say that these five methods are distinct and clearly defined
would be far from the truth. They are, rather than mere methods,
groups into which the federal courts have inadvertently fallen. The
instant case is no exception. It cites cases that do not fall within its
own group. This confusion clearly demonstrates the intensive need
of a uniform basis of evaluation to ascertain the amount in con-
troversy. The following rule is suggested: The amount in con-
troversy is always to be determined by the pecuniary damage which
the plaintiff would probably sustain if the defendant's acts were al-
income tax) ; Bronson v. Boards of Sup'rs, 237 Fed. 212 (N. D. Iowa 1916)
(suit to restrain construction of drainage ditch, causing overflow on plaintiff's
land).
I Reed, Fears, and Miller v. Miller, 2 F. (2d) 280 (E. D. Pa. 1924), aff'd.,
5 F. (2d) 1018 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1925) (suit to restrain defendant from entering
business similar to that of plaintiff); Railroad Commission of Louisiana v.
Texas & P. R. Co., 144 Fed. 68 (C. C. A. 5th, 1906) (suit to enjoin further
imposition of fine by commission).
Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Co. v. Gring, 159 Fed. 662 (C. C. A. 4th,
1908), certiorari denied, 212 U. S. 571, 29 Sup. Ct. 682, 53 L. ed. 655 (1903).
oNueces Valley Town-Site Co. v. McAdoo, 257 Fed. 143 (W. D. Tex.
1919) (suit to restrain acts of railroad administration, which acts saved it $400
per month); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Pacific Coast Lumber Manufacturers
Ass'n., 165 Fed. 1 (C. C. A. 9th, 1908) (suit to enjoin railroad companies from
establishing a new schedule of rates) ; Union Pac. R. Co. v. Oregon & Wash-
ington Lumber Manufacturers Ass'n., 165 Fed. 13 (C. C. A. 9th, 1908) (same).
2 American Smelting Co. v. Godfrey, 158 Fed. 225, 14 ANN. CAs. 8 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1907), certiorari denied, 207 U. S. 597, 28 Sup. Ct. 262, 52 L. ed. 357(1907); Rainey v. Herbert, 55 Fed. 443 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1893); Whitman v.
Hubbell, 30 Fed. 81 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1887).
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lowed to continue ;22 and the plaintiff shall not be turned out of court
unless it clearly appears that the jurisdictional amount is not involved.
It is believed that a strict adherence to this rule would not only rem-
edy the confusion now existent in injunction suits, but would work a
fair and plausible result, as being based upon the very purpose for
which the suit is brought.
The value of the object to be protected should never control, un-
less the damage inevitably goes to the whole value of that object.
Past damages cannot reasonably be considered as a part of the matter
in controversy. And to base the amount in controversy on the de-
fendant's prospective damage is to repudiate the principles on which
the purpose of the suit is founded. The fact that the plaintiff's right
is either negligible or incapable of evaluation furnishes no excuse
for such an inverse procedure. If the plaintiff's right is negligible,
he should be thrown out of court; if incapable of evaluation, he
should be allowed jurisdiction under the suggested rule.23
FRANK P. SPRUILL, JR.
Municipal Corporations-Eminent Domain-Right of Abutting
Owner to Compensation When Street Closed.
Pursuant to an agreement between the city and railroad company
for the elimination of grade crossings, the street on which plaintiff's.
property abutted was dosed at the end of the block, thus cutting off
his direct means of travel toward the business section and leaving his
premises fronting in a cul-de-sac. Plaintiff was held entitled to com-
pensation for the impairment of his easement, since he had suffered
special damages not common to the public at large.1
It is generally agreed by the courts that an abutting landowner
has an easement in the street for the purpose of ingress and egress, 2
' The following rule is suggested in DoBIE, FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PRO-
cEauRE (1928) §56: "The amount in controversy in the United States District
Court is always to be determined by the value to the plaintiff of the right
which he in good faith asserts in his pleading that sets forth the operative
facts which constitute his cause of action." Mr. Dobie calls this the "Plain-
tiff-viewpoint Rule." He discusses it more fully in a law review article: Dobie,.
Jurisdictional Amount in the United States District Court (1925) 38 HA~v. L.
REv. 733.
" For a collection of cases on the amount in controversy in injunction suits,
see 28 U. S. C. A. §292 to §305 (1927).
'Hiatt v. City of Greensboro, 201 N. C. 515, 160 S. E. 749 (1931).
'City of Texarkana v. Lawson, 168 S. W. 867 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) (own-
ership of lot abutting on a street carries with it the right of free and unim-
paired access thereto and egress from); Moose v. Carson, 104 N. C. 431, 10
S. E. 689 (1889) ; O'Brien v. Central Iron & Steel Co., 158 Ind. 218, 63 N. E.
302, 57 L. R. A. 508, 92 Am. St. Rep. 305 (1902); Schimmelman v. Lake Shore
etc. R. Co., 83 Ohio St. 356, 94 N. E. 840, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1164 (1911).
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and this is a property right which cannot be taken without just com-
pensation." The owner of property immediately abutting on the va-
cated portion of the street is entitled to damages in practically all
cases, whether such damages are expressly authorized by statute or
not.4 But in the cases where the property does not abut directly on
the closed section the authorities are not in accord.5 As a general
rule, under these circumstances, the owner is not entitled to compen-
sation if he still has access to the main system of streets.0 But if
such owner can show that he has suffered special damages differing
in kind, as well as in degree, from those sustained by the general
public, then he is entitled to damages.7 If the closing of the street
' Gargan v. Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry. Co., 89 Ky. 212, 12 S. W. 259, 6
.L. R. A. 340 (1889); Illinois Cent. Ry. Co. v. Moriarity, 135 Tenn. 446, 186
S. W. 1053 (1916) (if a street is obstructed so as to destroy or substantially
impair owner's easement he is entitled to compensation); 2 ELLIOTT, ROADS
.AND STUErS (4th ed. 1926) 1679, §1180; see Colvin v. Power Co., 199 N. C.
.353, 359, 154 S. E. 678, 681 (1930).
Acts vacating or closing streets have been held unconstitutional because no
compensation was provided for abutting owners. Bannon v. Rohmeiser, 90 Ky.
142, 13 S. W. 444, 29 Am. St. Rep. 355 (1890); Houston v. Town of West
Greenville, 126 S. C. 484, 120 S. E. 236 (1922) (street closed and plaintiff's
property left in a cul-de-sac). See (1923) 10 VA. L. Rzv. 484.
'Young v. Nichols, 152 Wash. 306, 278 Pac. 159 (1929) ; State v, Comm.
of Deer Lodge County, 19 Mont. 582, 49 Pac. 147 (1897) ; 2 ELLIOTT, 1oC. cit.
.supra note 3. Note (1910) 15 ANN. CAS. 687. See Note (1916) 16 COL. L.
REv. 139.
In many states the right of the abutting owner to compensation for the
vacation or closing of a street is based upon a statute. Note (1910) 15 ANN.
CAs. 688; Newark v. Hatt, 79 N. J. L. 548, 77 Atl. 47, 30 L. R. A. (N, S.)
637 (1910) ; Re Hoyt, 162 App. Div. 469, 147 N. Y. Supp. 599 (1914), aff'd. in
213 N. Y. 651, 107 N. E. 1079 (1914); Hedrick v. City of Harrisburg, 278 Pa.
274, 122 Atl. 281 (1923).
The Federal Constitution, as well as most state constitutions, provides that
private property cannot be taken for public use without just compensation.
U. S. CoxsT., AMEND. 5. The North Carolina constitution provides that no
person shall be deprived of his property except by the law of the land. N. C.
CoNsT., art. 1, §17. When the owner does not abut directly upon the closed
portion of the street, there is usually no taking of property within the meaning
of the constitutional provisions. The constitutional provision in some states
has been expanded so that no property can be taken or damaged without just
compensation. See Note (1926) 13 VA. L. REv. 334. Thus the damage to this
right of easement appurtenant to the property has been compensated when
there is no actual taking of the property.
STomaszewski v. Palmer Bee Co., 223 Mich. 565, 194 N. W. 571 (1923)
(mere inconvenience of property owner required to take a longer route is not
a taking of his property). Contra: Maletta v. Oliver Iron Mining Co., 135
Minn. 175, 160 N. W. 771 (1916) (allows compensation). See (1929) 39
-YALE L. J. 128.
0 Warner v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 86 Conn. 561, 86 Atl. 23 (1913);
.Symons v. San Francisco, 115 Cal. 555, 42 Pac. 913 (1897); In re Hull, 163
Minn. 439, 204 N. W. 534, 49 A. L. R. 320 (1925) ; Note (1927) 49 A. L. R. 330.
7 This rule was laid down in Smith v. Boston, 7 Cush. 534 (Mass. 1851),
znd is now recognized in practically all jurisdictions. Re Mellon Street, 182
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does not deprive the owner of access to and egress from his property,
but merely forces him to take a more circuitous route to reach the
main system of streets or the business section of the city, he is not,
as a rule, entitled to compensation since he has suffered no special
damages.8 But if the property is left fronting in a cul-de-sac, that is,
in a street with only one outlet, and direct access to the business sec-
tion is cut off, it is generally agreed that the owner may recover
damages.9 Where access has been cut off from one direction the
question that has perplexed the courts is whether the damages sus-
tained constitute damnum absque injuria, or whether, as a matter of
fact, he has been so placed in a cul-de-sac as to be entitled to com-
pensation under the exception to the general rule.'0
Pa. 397, 38 Atl. 281, 38 L. R. A. 275 (1897) ; Texarkana v. Lawson, supra note
2; Denver Union Terminal Ry. Co. v. Goldt, 67 Colo. 115, 186 Pac. 904 (1920);
Lowell v. Buffalo County, 119 Neb. 776, 230 N. W. 842 (1930).
'2 ELLiorr, op. cit. supra note 3, 1681, §1181; Kochele v. Bridgeport Hy-
draulic Co., 109 Conn. 151, 145, At. 756 (1929); Robinett v. Price, 74 Utah
512, 280 Pac. 736 (1929); German Evan. L. Church v. Mayor etc. of Balti-
more, 123 Md. 142, 190 AtI. 983, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 889 (1914) (although
approach from one direction is completely cut off). Contra: Illinois Cent. R.
Co. v. Moriarity, supra note 3 (property was a corner lot and the owner was
allowed compensation for the closing of one of the streets on which the lot
abutted).
An abutting landowner is not entitled to compensation for the closing of
neighboring streets, since the damages sustained are same as those of the gen-
eral public. Hyde v. Minnesota, D. & P. Ry. Co., 29 S. D. 220, 136 N. W. 92,
40 L. . A. (N. S.) 48 (1912); Cook v. City of Portland, 298 Pac. 900
(Ore. 1931) (lot opposite the end of a vacated street intersecting street on
which property fronted held not to "abut" on the vacated portion so as to entitle
owner to compensation).
'Vanderburg v. City of Minneapolis, 98 Minn. 329, 108 N. W. 480, 6 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 741 (1906) ; Falender v. Atkins, 186 Ind. 455, 114 N. E. 965 (1917)
(fact that property is left fronting in a cul-de-sac is taken with the other
facts to show special damages) ; Park City Yacht Club v. City of Bridgeport,
85 Conn. 366, 82 Atl. 1035 (1912) (cul-de-sac is exception to general rule);
Maletta v. Oliver Iron Mining Co., supra note 5; Note (1927) 49 A. L. R. 333.
Where statutes provide for compensation to abutting owners for the vaca-
tion or closing of the street, compensation is allowed when the property is
left fronting in a cul-de-sac. In Re Walton Ave., 131 App. Div. 696, 116
N. Y. Supp. 471 (1909) ; aff'd. in 197 N. Y. 518, 90 N. E. 59 (1909) ; Newark
v. Hatt, supra note 4.
"In City of Lynchburg v. Peters, 145 Va. 1, 133 S. E. 674 (1926), the
street upon which the lot abutted was vacated at one end, but not in front of
the property, leaving the owner an outlet upon two streets. It was held that
the damages sustained were damnum ab.sque injuria, since they differed merely
in degree from the damages suffered by the public. See Note (1927) 13 VA. L.
REv. 334.
Cram v. City of Laconia, 71 N. H. 41, 51 Atl. 631 (1901) (owner was held
not to have suffered special damages when the street was closed at the end of
the block on which his premises abutted, resulting in a diversion of travel,
and a depreciation of the value of the property) ; cf. City of Chicago v. Burchy,
158 Ill. 103, 42 N. E. 178 (1895) (recovery allowed when access from one
direction had been cut off) ; City of Texarkana v. Lawson, supra note 2.
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Although there is no statute in North Carolina providing for
compensation to abutting landowners when the street is closed or
vacated, the holding in the instant case is entirely in harmony with
the decisions allowing a recovery when the property is left fronting
in a cul-de-sac."1 The closing of the street amounted practically to
a discontinuance of the highway in front of the plaintiff's premises,
interfering with his access to the business section of the city, and
thereby diminishing the value of his property.12 The plaintiff, there-
fore, sustained special damages differing in kind as well as in degree
from those suffered by the public generally. 18 Upon the facts and
the law it would seem that the result reached by the court in the
instant case is correct.
A. T. ALLEN, JR.
Negotiable Instruments-Discharge of Indorser-Consent to
Extension of Time by "Subscribers."
In an action on a promissory note the indorsers set up the defense
that the holder made a binding agreement to extend the time of pay-
ment. The maker replies that there is a stipulation in the note that
"the subscribers agree to continue and remain bound notwithstand-
ing any extension of time granted the principal, hereby waiving any
and all notice of extension of time, nonpayment, or dishonor or pro-
test in any form or any other notice whatsoever." Held: The in-
dorsers are discharged. The word subscribers does not include per-
sons signing as indorsers on the back of the note.1
Literally, the word subscribe means to write one's name beneath
or to sign at the end of an instrument.2 It refers to the place of sig-
nature rather than to the manner thereof ;3 therefore the term sub-
'Vanderburgh v. City of Minneapolis; Falender v. Atkins, both supra note
'9; Maletta v. Oliver Iron Mining Co., supra note 5; Gargan v. Louisville, N.
-A. & C. Ry. Co., supra note 3 (held there was no authority to close street
without the owners consent, as it would be depriving them of their property
-without due process of law) ; O'Brien v. Central Iron & Steel Co., supra note
.2. See (1923) 8 MiNN. L. Ray. 342.
2Johnston v. Old Colony R. Co., 18 R. I. 642, 29 Atl. 594, 49 Am. St. Rep.
'800 (1894) (measure of damages is the difference in value of the property);
,Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Moriarity, supra note 3.
Vanderburgh v. City of Minneapolis; Park City Yacht Club v. City of
-Bridgeport, both supra note 9; Denver Union Terminal Ry. Co. v. Goldt, supra
mote 7 (owner was allowed compensation when only a narrow way was left).
'Corporation Commission v. Wilkinson, 201 N. C. 344, 160 S. E. 295 (1931).
I BouviER, LAW DIcTIONARY (1914) ; WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL Dic-
-arIoNARY (1931) ; 37 Cyc. 479 (1911) ; WORDS & PHRASES (2d 1914).
'Loughran v. Bonniwell & Co., 125 Iowa 518, 101 N. W. 287 (1904).
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scriber includes only those who have consented to the waiver in the
note by underwriting their names.
Prior to the adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Law persons
who indorsed in blank, before delivery, for the accommodation of the
maker, might have proved as between themselves and against anyone
but a holder without notice that they signed as co-makers, guarantors,
or indorsers.4 At present they are, nothing else appearing, indorsers, 5
.and their liability in the absence of a waiver, is conditioned upon due
-presentment, demand and notice of dishonor.6 Furthermore, a valid
extension7 of time without the knowledge and consent of the in-
-dorser8 operates to discharge him.
At common law a waiver on the face of a note was binding upon
all the indorsers, that being a part of the contract of indorsement 9
unless expressly excluded.' 0
The principal case seems correct in holding that the language
used expressly excludes defendant indorsers so far as extensions are
" BxaGEow, THE LAw OF BILLs, NOTES AND CHECKS (1928) §253 and cases
there cited; Davis v. Morgan, 64 N. C. 570 (1870); Baker v. Robinson, 62
N. C. 191 (1869); Mendenhall v. Davis, 72 N. C. 150 (1875); Hoffman v.
Moore, 82 N. C. 313 (1880) ; Southerland v. Fremont, 107 N. C.. 565, 12 S. E.
237 (1869).
-N. I. L. §§63, 64, N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §§3044, 3045; Houser
v. Fayssoux, 168 N. C. 1, 83 S. E. 692 (1914) ; Bank v. Wilson, 168 N. C. 557,
84 S. E. 866 (1915) ; Perry Co. v. Taylor Bros., 148 N. C. 362, 62 S. E. 423
(1908) ; Meyers Co. v. Battle, 170 N. C. 168, 86 S. E. 1034 (1915) ; Critcher
v. Ballard, 180 N. C. 111, 104 S. E. 134 (1920); BRANNAN, THE NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS LAW, 577, 578, and cases there cited.
'Dillard v. Mercantile Co., 190 N. C. 225, 129 S. E. 598 (1925) ; Perry v.
Taylor, supra note 5; Houser v. Fayssoux, supra note 5; Bank v. Wilson,
supra note 5; Meyers v. Battle, supra note 5; Gilliam v. Walker, 189 N. C.
189, 126 S. E. 424 (1925) ; Wren v. Cotton Mills, 198 N. C. 89, 150 S. E. 676(1929) ; BRANNAN, THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUmENTS LAW, 588 and cases there
cited.
7 If it be for a definite period and supported by a sufficient consideration.
N. I, L. §120 (6), N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §3102 (6) ; EATON & GIL-
BERT, COMMERCIAL PAPER (1903) §123; Second Nat'l Bank v. Graham, 246 Pa.
256. 92 Atl. 198 (1914) ; Union Trust Co. v. M'Crum, 145 App. Div. 409, 129
N. Y. Supp. 1078 (1911) ; Nat'l Park Bank v. Koehler, 204 N. Y. 174, 97 N. E.
468 (1912) ; Wren v. Cotton Mills, supra note 6; Bank v. Lineberger, 83 N. C.
454 (1880) ; Fertilizer Co. v. Eason, 194 N. C. 244, 139 S. E. 376 (1927).
'He being a party secondarily liable, Trust Co. v. York, 199 N. C. 624, 155
S. E. 263 (1930); Noble v. Beeman-Spaulding Co., 65 Ore. 93, 131 Pac. 1006(1913); First Nat!1 Bank v. Drake, 185 Iowa 879, 171 N. W. 115 (1919);
N. I. L. §192, N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie 1931) §2977.
'EATON & GnBERT, CommERcL PAPER (1903) par. 116 (f); 2 DANIEL,
NEOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (6th ed. 1919) §§1092, 1092 (a) ; Gordon v. Mont-
gomery, 19 Ind. 110 (1862) ; Swoope v. Boone County Bank, 125 Ky. 433, 101
S. W. 334 (1907); Williams Bros. v. Rosenbaum, 79 S. W. 594 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1904); Bryant v. Bank of Ky., 71 Ky. 43 (1871).
" Williams v. Merchants Nat'l Bank of Kansas City, 67 Tex. 609, 45 S. W.
.163 (1887).
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concerned. The Negotiable Instruments Law adopts the common
law rule as to notice of dishonor1 1 but contains no provisions relative
to agreements consenting to extensions. 12 It is submitted that the hold-
ing would be similar had the present case arisen by reason of failure
to give notice of dishonor or any other condition necessary to charge
an indorser.' 3
The standard form of notes in use throughout the state of North
Carolina generally includes such provisions as will obviate the diffi-
culty presented by the instant case. 14 Nevertheless this decision
should serve as a danger signal to all banks and bankers1" and moti-
vate them to a minute inspection of their formal notes. If such defect
be found it would be cured by inserting such words as, "all parties
hereto, including makers, indorsers, guarantors, and sureties waive
... etc., and agree to continue and remain bound notwithstanding."' 0
PAUL BOUCHER.
Trial Practice-Inconsistent Verdict-Special
Issues in Negligence.
The jury, on the issues submitted in an action for personal in-
juries, found that the defendant was negligent, that the plaintiff was
contributorily negligent, and that the plaintiff was entitled to dam-
ages. The judge ruled that the verdict was inconsistent, and again
submitted the issues, charging that damages could be found for the
plaintiff only if the second issue was answered "No." On an appeal
from this ruling it was held, that the firsf verdict rendered was not
inconsistent, and that it entitled defendant to judgment.'
'N. I. L. §110; BRANxAN, THE NEoGnIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (4th ed.
1926) 707; Bank of Fredericksburg v. Knopp, 256 S. W. 319 (Tex. Civ. App.
1923); Frank-Taylor-Kendrick Co. v. Voissement, 142 La. 973, 77 So. 895
(1918) ; Leach v. Urschel, 112 Kan. 629, 212 Pac. 111 (1923); Newton County
Bank v. Montgomery, 175 S. W. 803 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915); Owensboro Bank
& Trust Co. v. Haynes, 143 Ky. 534, 136 S. W. 1004 (1911).
N. I. L. §126, N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §3092 (6),23Supra note 11; EATON & GILBERT, COMMERCIAL PAPER (1903) §108; Perry
v. Taylor, supra note 5; see Bank v. Johnson, 169 N. C. 526, 86 S. E. 360
(1915) ; Gillian v. Walker, .supra note 6.
"
4An examination of the formal notes in use by many North Carolina
banks, representative of the different sections, disclosed only one note contain-
ing such a defect.
' Under the N. I. L. it is submitted that all the states should reach a similar
holding.
11 Such a provision does not impair the negotiability of the note. Taft v.
Covington, 199 N. C. 51, 153 S. E. 597 (1930) ("the drawer and endorser and
all sureties hereto . . .") ; First Nat'l Bank of Pomeroy v. Battery, 17 N. D.
326, 116 N. W. 341 (1908) ("the makers and indorsers herein") ; BRANNAN,
NEGOTIABr INSTRUMENT LAW (4th ed. 1926) 757.
'Allen v. Yarborough, 201 N. C. 568, 160 S. E. 833 (1931).
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When a verdict is inconsistent, repugnant, or insensible, so that
no judgment can be rendered thereon, it may be sent back to the
jury for reconsideration. 2 However, a finding which is mere sur-
plusage does not vitiate the whole verdict." The verdict in the prin-
cipal case, while falling more nearly into the latter category, is not
in a strict sense a "surplusage" verdict. It results from the practice
in North Carolina of submitting several issues of specific fact to the
jury, and may best be explained in terms of such practice.
In many jurisdictions the general issue, "Is the plaintiff entitled
to recover of the defendant, and if so, in what amount?" could have
been submitted here.4 Upon this the jury would make a general
finding for the plaintiff or defendant, which would include both law
and fact.5 This general issue is not submitted in negligence cases in
North Carolina, but instead issues of particular controverted facts.6
These facts being found, it is left to the judge to determine, as a
2 State v. Hudson, 74 N. C. 246 (1876); State v. Whitaker, 89 N. C. 473
(1883) ; Mitchell v. Brown, 107 N. C. 322, 12 S. E. 130 (1890) ; Kornegay v.
Kornegay, 109 N. C. 188, 13 S. E. 770 (1890) ; Johnson v. Townsend, 122 N. C.
442, 29 S. E. 419 (189) ; State v. Parker, 152 N. C. 790, 67 S. E. 35 (1909) ;
West Lumber Co. v. Keen, 237 S. W. 236 (Tex. Comm. App. 1922); Williams
v. Zang, 279 S. W. 815 (Tex. Crim. App. 1926); 1 HYATr, TRIALS (1924)
§736; McINToSH, N. C. PRACTIcE AND PRocEuR (1929) §663; 38 Cyc. 1926
(1911).
8 State v. Arrington, 7 N. C. 571 (1819)'; Hawkins v. House, 65 N. C. 614
(1871); McCaskill v. Curry, 113 N. C. 313, 18 S. E. 252 (1893); Equitable
Co. v. Stout, 135 Ind. 444, 33 N. E. 623 (1893) ; Chic. & E. Ry. Co. v. Barger,
82 Ind. App. 266, 144 N. E. 646 (1924); Aycock v. Parraffine Oil Co., 210
S. W. 851 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) ; 1 HYATT, TRIALs (1924) §824; McINTosr,
N. C. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1929) §601; 27 R. C. L. 883 (1920).
" Brown v. Wright, 100 Conn. 193, 123 AtI. 7 (1923) ; McKoy v. City of
Wichita, 86 Kan. 943, 122 Pac. 894 (1912); Barnett v. Roberts, 243 Mass. 233,
137 N. E. 353 (1922) ; 38 Cyc. 1869 (1911); 27 R. C. L. 866 (1920).
"The peculiarity of the general verdict is the merger into a single re-
siduum of all matters, however numerous, whether of law or fact. It is a
compound made by the jury which is incapable of being broken up into its
constituent parts. . . . Three elements enter into the general verdict (1) the
facts, (2) the law, and (3) the application of the law to the facts." Sunder-
land, Verdicts, General and Special, 29 YALE L. J. 250 (1920); 1 HYATT,
TIALs (1924) §712; 38 Cyc. 1869 (1911); 27 R. C. L. 834 (1920). See also
note 4, stipra.
I Denmark v. Ati. Ry. Co., 107 N. C. 185, 12 S. E. 54 (1890) ; Kimberly v.
Howland, 143 N. C. 398, 55 S. E. 778, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 545 (1906). These
are designated as "general" verdicts in North Carolina. Porter v. Western
N. C. Ry. Co., 97 N. C. 66, 2 S. E. 580 (1887) ; Witsell v. West A. & S. Ry.
Co., 120 N. C. 557 (1897) ; McINTosH, N. C. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1929)
653. The corresponding issues of fact in other jurisdictions are termed "spe-
cial" verdicts. Chicago Brick Co. v. Rembarg, 150 Ill. 192, 37 N. E. 239
(1894) ; Texas Elect. Ry. v. Burt, 272 S. W. 255 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) ; Innes
v. City of Milwaukee, 96 Wis. 170, 70 N. W. 1064 (1897) ; Wis. STAT. (1921)§2858.
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matter of law, who is entitled to judgment.7 This judgment is given
only after considering the findings as a whole, and in their relation
to one another.8 Thus each finding has a special bearing on the
construction of the verdict.
Under this practice the instant decision seems correct. The de-
fendant's negligence does not preclude contributory negligence on
the part of the plaintiff, for this is a typical situation in negligence
cases.9 But unless there is a statute by which contributory negligence
is considered only in mitigation of damages,10 or the "last clear
chance" doctrine is invoked," the plaintiff's contributory negligence
will prevent his recovery.12 The issue of damages in the principal
case is not a general verdict for the plaintiff, but is only one of the
issues determining the plaintiff's right to recover.' 3 As the other
findings did not establish such right, the plaintiff cannot recover.' 4
The right to recover not being established, the damage issue is a sur-
plusage only in a sense of being unnecessary to a final judgment.
I "The provision in our present system of procedure for submitting issues
was adopted for the purpose of enabling the jury to find the material facts
with as little consideration as possible of principles of law, sometimes difficult
for them to understand and apply, and so that the court, upon the facts thus
found, may with greater care and accuracy declare the law, and thus determine
the legal rights of the'parties." Walker, J., in Hatcher v. Dobbs, 133 N. C. at
241, 45 S. E. at 562 (1903) ; Bowen v. Whitaker, 92 N. C. 367 (1885) ; Burton
v. Rosemary Mfg. Co., 132 N. C. 17, 43 S. E. 480 (1903).
'Holton v. Moore, 165 N. C. 549, 81 S. E. 779, ANN. CAS. 1915 D. 246
(1914Y (Where plaintiff on all the findings was not allowed to recover, though
a finding of damages was in his favor) ; Baker v. R. R., 118 N. C. 1015, 24
S. E. 415 (1895).
I Morrison v. Cornelius, 63 N. C. 346 (1868) ; Manley v. Wilmington Ry.
Co., 74 N. C. 655 (1876) ; McCausland v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 198 Ill. App.
200 (1916); Morris v. Kansas City Light Co., 302 Mo. 475, 258 S. W. 431
(1924); Penn. Ry. Co. v. Jenkins 119 Va. 186, 89 S. E. 96 (1917); CLARX,
LAW OF TORTS (1926) §133; 45 C. J. 976 (1928).
"
0FEDERAI. EMPLOYER'S LIABrrIIT Acr, c. 1, 49 STAT. 1908, §3, 45 U. S. C. A.
§53; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §3467; MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927)
§4935; Miss. LAws (1913) c. 622; MASS. GEN. LAwS (1921) c. 160, §232;
NEB. Coau. STAT. (1922) §8834; OHIo ANN. CODE (Throckmorton, 1929)
§6245-1.
"Gunter v. Wicker, 85 N. C. 310 (1880) ; Clark v. R. R., 109 N. C. 430,
14 S. E. 43 (1891) ; Pickett v. R. R., 117 N. C. 616, 23 S. E. 264 (1898) ; Mc-
Manus v. Seaboard Ry. Co., 174 N. C. 735, 94 S. E. 455 (1917); Fry v Sou.
Pub. Utilities Co., 183 N. C. 281, 111 S. E. 354 (1922); Dover v. Archam-
bault, 57 Cal. App. 659, 208 Pac. 178 (1922); Tullock v. Conn. Co., 94 Conn.
201, 108 Atl. 556 (1919) ; State v. Glen Echo Park Co., 137 Md. 529, 113 Atl.
85 (1921) ; CL.Ax, LAw OF TORTS (1921) §134; 45 C. J. 984 (1928).
'Supra note 9.
' Hamilton v. Lumber Co., 160 N. C. 48, 75 S. E. 1087 (1912) ; Sasser v.
Lumber Co., 165 N. C. 242, 81 S. E. 320 (1913); McKoy v. Craven, 198 N. C.
180, 151 S. E. 94 (1930).
For the plaintiff's own negligence precluding his recovery see supra note 9.
